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A STUDY OF ASRS REPORTS INVOLVING
GENERAL AVIATION AND WEATHER ENCOUNTERS
by
Thomas H. Rockwell,
Darrell E. Roach,
and
Walter C. Giffin*
SUMMARY
This report describes a study of material in the ASRS data base dealing
with weather-related incidents in General Aviation. Factors leading to such
incidents are discussed and analyzed. Consideration is given to the nature
and characteristics of problems involving dissemination of weather informa-
tion, use of this information by pilots, its adequacy for the purpose
intended, the ability of the air traffic control system to cope with
weather-related incidents, and the various aspects of pilot behavior, air-
craft equipment and NAVAIDS affecting flights in which weather figures. It
is concluded from the study that skill and training deficiencies of GA pilots
are not major factors in weather-related occurrences, nor is lack of aircraft
equipment. Major problem causes are identified with timely and easily inter-
preted weather information, judgement and attitude factors of pilots, and the
functioning of the ATC system.
INTRODUCTION
Analysis of general aviation aircraft accidents indicates
often fail to deal effectively with weather-induced problems.
that pilots
The National
*The authors are faculty members at Ohio State University and serve as con-
sultants to the ASRS program.
Transportation Safety Boardrs tabulation of 1978 general aviation accidents,*
published in its annual review of accident statistics, indicated that
weather-related accidents led all other types of causes. There were 150
fatal accidents resulting from pilots encountering bad weather; whether this
is the result of inaccurate forecasts, deteriorating weather, or poor pilot
judgement, constitutes an important safety problem for general aviation.
The question is often posed about the ability of general aviation pilots
to cope with weather problems. What is not known is the extent to which such
problems are due to inadequate weather information systems, inadequate air-
craft capability, lack of sufficient training for general aviation pilots, or
lack of responsiveness of the air traffic control system.
STUDYOBJECTIVES
The ASRSdata base on General Aviation weather-related incidents was
examined to shed light on how humanor systems problems link with weather to
create unsafe conditions. The overall objective of this study was to deter-
mine if patterns emerge which would explain more fully current accident
reports and to suggest appropriate counter-measures. The ASRS data were
examined to ascertain:
I. The nature of the weather problem in the related
incident. Factors considered included the weather condi-
tion at the time of the incident, the pilot's use of
information systems available to him, the adequacy of the
weather information for planning purposes, and the abil-
ity of the air traffic control system to provide weather
information.
2. The characteristics of the weather-related incident. Did
an unsafe condition result, and how serious was it? What
types of aircraft are most often involved?
3. The types of pilot and system problems contributing to
the incident.
*As reported in AOPAPilot, December1980, p. 88.
4. The nature of pilot and system attributes which contri-
buted to the problems, e.g., pilot experience.
APPROACH
The basis for this study was all reports of incidents from the ASRSsys-
tem covering the period from May 1978 to September 1980. The search pro-
cedure involved selection of all incidents which met the following criteria:
a. The incident was weather related, i.e., weather was con-
sidered a contributing factor in the cause or consequence
of the incident; weather, for purposes of this report,
could be instrument meteorological conditions (IMC),
i.e., visibility below three miles and/or ceilings below
i000 ft. (agl) in controlled airspace; marginal VMC,
i.e., visibility 3-5 miles and/or ceilings 1000-3000 ft.,
visual meteorological conditions (VMC), i.e., visibility
greater than 3 miles and ceilings above 3000 ft. (agl) in
controlled airspace and visibility one mile and clear of
clouds in uncontrolled airspace. Mixed IMCand VMC(MXD)
could also be a factor as will be shown later.
b. The incident involved at least one aircraft which was not
an air carrier or military aircraft. This embraces all
general aviation aircraft from small aircraft (SMA-less
than 5000 ibs.) to small and medium transports. In the
case of a potential conflict between two aircraft, mili-
tary and air carrier could be involved if one of the air-
craft involved "General Aviation" operations. This term
embraces all flight operations except air carriers and
military, and includes pleasure, business, corporate, and
air taxi.
Onehundred seventy-seven reports met the above criteria.
It was evident at the outset of this study that these reports were not
homogeneous with respect to their characteristics, e.g., weather, type of
aircraft, location, etc. Thus, it was decided to classify these reports into
six categories as follows:
a. Single aircraft under IFR flight (27 reports).
b. Single VFRaircraft in adverse weather (52 reports).
c. Less than standard separation (LTSS) or potential con-
flicts (or in the extreme case, near midair collision
events) between two aircraft operating on IFR flight
plans (IFR/IFR); (34 reports).
d. LTSSor potential conflicts between two aircraft, one of
which was presumed to be VFRand one of which was usually
on an IFR flight plan (mixed flight rule operations).(43 reports).
e. Weather services which, while not involving a specific
in-flight event, were included because of complaints
about the weather information system or the inadequacies
of the FSSsystem and ATCsystem (14 reports).
f. Balloons (5 reports).
Because of multiple reports for the same incidents, there were 27
incidents for the single IFR aircraft, 52 for the single VFRaircraft, 23 for
the IFR/IFR and 42 for the mixed flight rule two aircraft incident. Thus,
the 177 reports actually described 163 separate incidents for all six
categories.
Setting aside the balloon and weather service reports, the basis for the
four major classifications can be seen in Figures 1 to 7. Figure I shows
that the four categories are quite different in terms of the involvement of
small general aviation aircraft (less than 5000 Ibs.) which was one of the
main interests in this analysis. In the IFR/IFR cases, small general avia-
tion aircraft were virtually non-existent. Yet, for the single VFRaircraft
incidents, 90 percent were small general aviation aircraft. Figure 2 indi-
cates that over half of the single IFR incidents occurred under 1000 ft. agl
while virtually none (4 percent) of the IFR/IFR incidents occurred at or
below this altitude. Where humanerror was assigned by the ASRSanalyst,
Figure 3 shows that flight crews were indicated in 80 percent of the mixed
flight rule incidents as compared to 50 percent of the single VFRand 35 per-
cent for both the single IFR and IFR/IFR incidents. Figure 4 indicates that
IMCconditions existed in 75 percent of the single IFR incidents, but in only
45 percent of the single VFRincidents. Here marginal VMC and MXD weather
was reported in 41 percent of the incidents. Even the time of year varies
across these categories as shownin Figure 5. Note that 26 percent of the
single IFR incidents involved summermonths, while 50 percent of the two-
aircraft incidents occurred in the summermonths. This fact supports the
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differences found in the in-flight weather encounters. More than half of the
IFR/IFR incidents reported thunderstorms, while less than 15 percent of the
other three categories involved thunderstorms. (Figure 6).
Where the pilot flight time was noted, approximately 75 percent of the
single IFR and mixed flight plan pilots had more than 1500 total hours, while
this figure drops to 22 percent for the pilots in the single VFR aircraft
incidents. (See Figure 7).
With the above pattern differences, it was clear that adding statistics
from these categories would have produced erroneous conclusions. Hence, the
subsequent analysis treats each of the basic categories independently.
Later, in the conclusion section, attempts will be madeto draw inferences
amongthese categories.
CHARACTERIZATIONF THESINGLEIFR AIRCRAFTWEATHER-RELATEDINCIDENTS
Twenty-seven of the 163 total weather-related incidents examined
involved a single IFR aircraft. Of these incidents, 45 percent were small
general aviation aircraft (less than 5000 ibs.). About half of the incidents
occurred in the period of Noonto 6:00 P.M.; 75 percent were reported in day-
time conditions; 55 percent occurred under 1000 feet (AGL) and were involved
with approach, landing, or take-off phases of flight. Unlike other
categories of incident reports of GAaircraft in weather, which were over-
represented in the summermonths, the winter months were over-represented in
single IFR incidents. Over 50 percent of all single aircraft IFR incidents
were reported in Decemberthrough March. For these incidents, the weather
was usually IMC (75 percent of the cases).
It should be noted that except for four or five cases, the weather
should not have been a significant factor in the incidents. IFR flight sys-
tems are designed to permit safe and efficient air transport in poor weather,
e.g., 200-feet ceilings and I/2-mile visibility for most ILS approaches.
Thus, it might be argued that, in single aircraft IFR operations, weather
should not pose a serious problem. The few cases of enroute icing and turbu-
lence are the exceptions in this class of incidents.
Since 55 percent of the incidents involved small transport (SMT) or
larger aircraft, it is not surprising that pilot qualifications (in the cases
where this was reported) showedthat 75 percent of the pilots had more than
1500 hours. The nature of the single IFR aircraft problem is best shownin
Table I. Note that the 27 incidents were widely scattered over 8 problems.
Landing below published minimums, severe weather encountered, and failure to
accept or receive clearances represent the most reported incidents.
TABLEI. SINGLEAIRCRAFTIFR INCIDENTS
Landing below published minimums ...... 4
Failure to secure or accept clearance • • • 5
Airport diversions ............. 2
Vectors into severe weather
(or failure to receive vectors
away from ................. 4
Landing runway incidents .......... 3
Failure to maintain altitude ........ 3
In-flight icing .............. 2
Miscellaneous ............... 4
Total .................. 27
In assessing human errors associated with these incidents (Table 2), it
should be noted that in many cases the error is not always certain -- the
classic case is landing when the weather is near published minimums.
Although the weather may be just below minimums, it can change quickly. In
one incident, the pilot argued that the weather was well above minimums
rather than below. The errors behind five incidents were caused by pilots
breaking instrument flight rules regarding clearances and landing minimums.
Most of these incidents involved small transports with very experienced
pilots. In one of these incidents a crew acknowledged landing when the
weather was below published minimums.
TABLE2. ERRORSASSOCIATEDWITHSINGLEAIRCRAFT
IFR WEATHER-RELATEDINCIDENTS
CommunicationProblems ............. II
PLT- ATC .............. 6
TWR- CTLR.............. 1
PLT- FSS .............. 1
PLT- Airport ............ 1
ATC- Airport ............ 1
CNTL- FSS .............. 1
Violation of Instrument Flight Rules ...... 5
Inadequate Weather Pre-Fllght ......... 5
No Error .................... 2
Miscellaneous ................. 4
Total ..................... 27
Communicationsproblems, of the eleven most involved a communication
breakdown between pilot and controller (six instances). These included alti-
tude assignment misunderstandings, problems in securing clearances, and
weather deviation. Surprisingly, there were many cases of communication
problems between combinations of pilots, flight service stations, tower con-
trollers, approach controllers, and enroute controllers, as typified by the
following narrative:
"Myself, a journeyman CTLR, and the FAC chief (working
for a CTLR on sick leave) were on duty, day shift, a VFR
TWR. WX autowriter was out and FSS agreed to supply RAP-
CON with current WX. ILS rwy 3 in use. Apch called with
SMT A 20 south, ILS 3. I asked if he had the latest WX
with I/4 mile vls. He said no. I gave him the WX,
adding that the RVV on 34 was 5/8 and recommended that
rwy. RAPCON CTLR responded OK, I'll tell him. Snow
removal was in progress on all rwy, I told gnd cntl to
clear the plows off 34 and turned the apch lights on.
SMT A reported the outer marker, was clrd to land. After
idg, and taxiing is not visible from the TWR, it was
resolved SMT A had made the ILS 3 apch and landed on 3
with a large snow sweeper in the center of the rwy. A
turned off short of that point and never saw the vehicle.
I thought the conditions automatically dictated 34. The
apch CTLR merely gave the info to the pilot who continued
for 3. There was no further discussion."
9
Five incidents involved lack of proper information on runway conditions.
These resulted in diversions due to closed runways, flareouts in deep slush,
landing excursions, and a near-accldent with a snow sweeper. There were five
cases of poor pre-flight preparation by pilots - two involving decision to
fly into known icing conditions.
Table 3 depicts some of the factors behind the observed errors. Weather
interpretation, lack of knowledge of the IFR system, lack of airport informa-
tion, and unprofessional attitude, as inferred by the ASRS @nalyst, dominate
these data.
TABLE 3. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IN HUMAN ERRORS IN
SINGLE AIRCRAFT IFR WEATHER-RELATED INCIDENTS
Weather Interpretation ..........
Knowledge of the IFR System
and ATC Priorities ...........
Inadequate Airport Information ......
Weather Induced Workload .........
Unprofessional Attitude .........
Miscellaneous ..............
None...................
Total
3
5
2
4
5
3
.................. 27
Generalizations
For the single IFR aircraft, the 27 weather-related incidents could
almost be considered substandard performance in the IFR system. Severe
weather abnormalities were infrequently involved. Most incidents involved
normal IMC. The incidents were less involved with General Aviation small
aircraft than with larger General Aviation transports, suggesting that pilot
experience and aircraft equipment were probably not key factors in the
incidents. If weather, experience, and aircraft capability were not key
10
causes, what were the bases of the incidents? Four major causes appear to be
prevalent in the data:
I. Violations of instrument flying rules.
2. Communicationbreakdownsbetween FSSspecialists or air
traffic controllers and pilots.
3. Poor pre-flight planning.
4. Weather interpretations, i.e., the recognition of when
conditions have gone from VMCto IMC.
Violations of instrument flight rules include pilots bending the rules
or breaking them altogether -- this ranges from landing when the weather was
below published minimumsto refusing to accept clearances. Reports of com-
munication confusions were expected; such problems are always with us. What
was not expected was the lack of transmission of airport and runway informa-
tion for winter flying. Poor pre-flight planning includes not only failure
to secure necessary weather information, but also taking chances with icing
in aircraft not equipped to cope with it. Weather interpretation involved
rake-offs into IMCwithout IFR clearances.
SINGLEVFRAIRCRAFTIN ADVERSEWEATHER
A total of 52 incidents involving VFR pilots who encountered adverse
weather conditions were identified in the ASRSdata file. It should be
pointed out that these incidents may not be representative of typical general
aviation weather encounters. In most of these incidents the pilot was in
contact with an ATC facility or flight service station. None resulted in
accidents (to be expected; ASRS does not process accident reports) and only
one involved an off-airport landing. Thus, the GA pilot who extricates him-
self from a potentially dangerous situation and does not report to anyone is
not represented, nor is the pilot involved in an accident. It is worthwhile,
however, to examine the reported incidents to ascertain if patterns exist
which might lead to improvements in weather reporting, the ATC system, or
pilot training.
Ii
The analysis which follows resembles a flight log including pre-flight
weather briefings, the flight phase of the weather encounter, the pilot's
action in response to the encounter, the nature of assistance requested, if
any, the recovery factors, and other contributing factors.
Almost all (49 out of 52) of the incidents in this set involved small
aircraft. The other three incidents involved small transports. The majority
(43) were reported by pilots. The others were reported by controllers (7)
and observers (2). The two observers reporting were flight instructors
reporting on situations encountered by their students.
While, as Table 4 shows, incidents occurred in every month of the year,
they were most frequent during the summermonths. This is probably the
result of a higher level of general aviation activity during the summer.
TABLE4. REPORTEDMONTHOF OCCURRENCE
Month I Incidents Month Incidents
January
February
March
April
May
June
6
5
3
5
1
4
Total - 52
July
August
September
October
November
December
I0
I0
4
I
2
I
Little information concerning pilot ratings was available from the ASRS
reports. In 41 of the incidents the pilot's rating was reported as unknown.
It maybe inferred that these were largely non-lnstrument rated pilots.
Pilots of all experience levels were involved in these weather
incidents. Although the largest group consisted of relatively low time
pilots (19 reported less than 500 hours), as Table 5 shows, there were 14
12
pilots with more than 1000 hours. This raises somequestions as to the role
of experience in avoiding VFRflight in adverse weather, and whether more
experienced pilots are willing to take more chances. Perhaps kinds of
experience, attitude, and judgement all interact to contribute to the pilot's
involvement. It does not appear that experience alone, as indicated by
reported flight hours, is the major contributing factor.
TABLE5. REPORTEDEXPERIENCEOF PILOTS
INVOLVEDIN VFRFLIGHTIN IMC WEATHER
[Note: Onepilot reported I year of experience]
Flight Time Incidents Flight Time Incidents
3000 Hours or More
1000 - 2999 Hours
500 - 999 Hours
300 - 499 Hours
8
6
6
3
200 - 299 Hours
i00 - 199 Hours
99 Hours or Less
Unknown
7
6
3
13
Total - 52
Tables 6 and 7 show the weather conditions at the time of the incident
as related by the reporter. In most of the incidents the weather was
reported as IMC or mixed. Only one incident was reported as VFR and that
involved a situation of reduced visibility created by rain showers. Fog
and/or rain was present in 16 of the reported incidents, and there was a bro-
ken or solid overcast in 26 of the situations. Visibility of less than 3
miles was reported in 15 incidents and in 2 incidents the visibility was less
than one mile.
What led these pilots into weather encounters? The obvious initial
question relates to their preflight planning. Did they check the current and
forecast weather for their departure, destination, and enroute stations?
13
TABLE6. REPORTEDFLIGHTCONDITIONSAT THE
TIME OFTHEWEATHERINCIDENT
IMC ................ 32
Mixed IMC and VFR ......... 12
Marginal VFR ........... 5
VFR................ 1
Unreported ............ 2
Total ............... 52
TABLE7. REPORTEDWEATHERCONDITIONSAT TIME OF INCIDENT
r
Obscuration Sky Cover Visibility
Fog 8
Rain 8
Haze/Smog 4
Snow 3
Unknown 29
52
Overcast 20
Broken 6
Obscured 3
Other 2
Scattered 2
Unknown 19
7 Miles 1
3 Miles I
2 I/2 Miles 2
2 Miles 2
1 I/2 Miles 5
1 Mile 4
1/2 Mile or
Less 2
Unknown 35
5252
Table 8 shows the number of pilots reporting a preflight weather briefing and
the forecast they received.
14
TABLE8. WHETHERPILOTRECEIVEDA PRE-FLIGHTWEATHER
BRIEFING,SOURCE,ANDFORECASTWEATHER
r
Pre-Flight Briefing Forecast Weather
Yes: Flight Service 22
Yes: (Source Unknown) I0
Yes: (Military) 1
No 3
Unknown 16
Total 52
VFR 14
Marginal VFR 6
IMC 4
Fog 2
Unknown 26
52
Most pilots reported receiving a preflight weather briefing from a
flight service station, while others reported receiving preflight weather,
but did not mention the source. Probably most of these were also from flight
service stations, although some may have used PATWAS, TWEB, TV weather, or
other sources. Three pilots reported no weather briefing. Two of these
pilots had flown earlier in the day and had experienced favorable VMC at that
time. The third pilot took off to practice night landings at the local air-
port and encountered ground fog.
Most of the pilots who commented reported the forecast weather as VMC.
However, it cannot be determined from the reports how much above VFR minimums
the weather was forecast to be. Was it barely VMC, e.g., 1200 and 4 with a
change to 800 and 2 in rain showers? In such a case, it would not require
much weather deterioration for the pilot to find himself in IMC conditions.
If the forecast was for clear and unrestricted visibility, the pilot would
certainly not expect weather problems. In any case, these pilots initiated
their flights either because they expected only weather problems with which
they could cope, or they were willing to take the risk of possible deteriora-
tion because of "get homeitis" or other factors.
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In 6 of the incidents the reported forecast weather was marginal VFR
conditions. Not muchdeterioration was needed for the pilot to find himself
in IFR conditions. Of the four pilots who took off in IMC conditions, one
requested a special VFR(SVFR) clearance, and three took off VFRin IMC con-
ditions.
It appears that manyof the pilots involved in these incidents did check
the weather, but were surprised by unforecast weather or decided to take a
chance on the weather not deteriorating. Several pilots (12) reported
requesting weather updates in flight. No weather updates were indicated by 9
pilots, and in 24 of the incidents, it could not be determined whether or not
updated weather was requested. There were also 7 incidents in which weather
updates were not practical, since the pilot encountered IMC shortly after
take off.
As shownin Table 9 most of the weather encounters (32) occurred while
.... the pilot was enroute. The weather was encountered at the cruise flight
level (23) and often involved operating above a cloud deck (VFRon top - 12).
Eight encountered IMC conditions immediately after takeoff or climb out.
Several others did not encounter the weather problem until they arrived at
their destination airport and found that the airport was IMC. There were two
incidents in which the IMCwere not encountered until the pilot was approach-
ing to land. Oneof these involved a pilot who cancelled his IFR flight plan
and landed at the destination airport without realizing that the field was
IMC.
The pilots who reported the weather as underneath or encountered upon
descent were involved in situations in which ground fog or haze existed at
the destination airport.
The nature of the weather encounter is shown in Table I0. The most fre-
quent encounter was reduced visibility (20 incidents). Rain showers (6
incidents) and ground fog (5 incidents) also resulted in reduced visibility
either enroute or when attempting to land.
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TABLE9. FLIGHTPHASEANDLEVELOFWEATHERENCOUNTER
Flight Phase at
Weather Encounter
Enroute 32
Takeoff and Climb 8
Destination I0
Approach or Landing 2
Total 52
Level of
Encounter
Cruise 23
On Top 12
Climb Out 8
Underneath 3
Approach and
Landing 3
Descent 2
Not Applicable 2
52
Several reporters (I0) indicated that clouds had closed beneath them and
two reported that they were between merging layers. Only 2 pilots reported
problems trying to stay below an overcast. There were three incidents
involving thunderstorms. One involved a pilot attempting to fly between two
cells when they closed; one involved a pilot encountering cells and making a
precautionary landing; and the other involved a pilot penetrating a res-
tricted area after becoming unsure of his position while deviating around
thunderstorms. Thunderstorms do not appear to constitute a frequent problem
factor in weather encounters involving VFRpilots. Thunderstorm activity may
appear so threatening to the VFRpilot, (e.g., dark sky and lightning) that
he immediately deviates or lands, and consequently avoids this weather condi-
tion. Of the five incidents of flight into clouds, two involved pilots who
were on SVFRclearances and encountered clouds on climb out, but proceeded to
climb through the layer to VFRon top. Twoothers involved deteriorating
weather in which the pilot continued while contacting ATCor FSS. The last
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TABLEI0• NATUREOFWEATHERENCOUNTERINDICATEDBY REPORTERS*
ReducedVisibility ........... 20
Broken or Solid Undercast ....... I0
Rain 6
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Flew Into Clouds ............ 5
Ground Fog ............... 5
Thunderstorms ............. 3
Merging Cloud Layers .......... 2
Lowering Ceiling ............ 2
Saw or Heard of]
Deteriorating Weather Ahead ...... 2
Rising Cloud Tops ........... 1
Strong Cross Winds ........... 1
Unknown But IMC Conditions ....... 2
*Totals over 52 since some pilots encountered more than one condition.
involved a pilot trying to stay underneath a lowering ceiling and, becoming
concerned about obstructions, climbed into the clouds before contacting ATC.
The actions taken by the pilots upon encountering the adverse weather
conditions are shown in Table Ii. During training VFR pilots are frequently
advised of the value of a "180 degree turn" when encountering adverse
weather• It is apparent that many of them waited too long to execute a 180
degree turn. In some cases, such as ground fog at the departure airport, a
return to VMC was not a feasible option. As shown in Table II, the most fre-
quent actions reported were contacting ATC (ii) or landing at an enroute air-
port (9). Some pilots reported climbing or descending through cloud layers
in an attempt to get out of the adverse weather condition•
Incidents where the flight was reported as "continued" represent a
variety of situations• They include requesting SVFR at destination airport,
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TABLEii. REPORTEDPILOT ACTIONUPONWEATHERENCOUNTER
Contacted ATC................ II
Landed Enroute ............... 9
Contacted FSS• . • _ ........... _ 5
Continued Flight .............. 5
Made180 Degree Turn or Returned
To Departure Airport ............ 8
Requested SVFRClearance .......... 4
Landed at Destination in Reported IMC .... 4
Climbed or Attempted to Climb on Top .... 4
Climbed Into or Through Cloud Layer ..... 3
Descendedto Stay Below Cloud Layer ..... 3
Deviated Around Weather ........... 3
Contacted ATCand Requested IFR Clearance . . 3
Attempted But Unable to Contact ATC ..... 3
Cancelled IFR and Requested SVFRto
Destination Airport ............. 2
Broadcast on 121.5 ............. 2
DescendedThrough Hole in Undercast ..... 2
Other .................... 6
finding VFRon top, descending through a hole in the overcast, and encounter-
ing momentary patches of IMCconditions.
In most of the incidents it appears that the pilot waited too long
before taking action. Whenaction was taken, the pilot requested help from a
ground facility, landed at an enroute airport or, perhaps because of get
home-iris or a belief that things would get better, took steps to continue
the flight.
Most pilots (44) did not make a precautionary 180 degree turn when
encountering adverse weather. Table 12 shows reasons for their decisions.
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TABLE 12.
Unknown ............. I0
Option Not Feasible ....... 7
Landed Enroute .......... 6
Requested IFR or
SVFR Clearance ......... 5
Deviating Around Weather .... 3
Made Instrument Approach .... 2
Other .............. II
REASONS FOR NOT MAKING A RETURN TO VMC
In I0 of the incidents the reason could not be determined. There were
several isolated reasons (II), such as lost student pilots, pilots not real-
izing the airport was below VFR minimums, and breaking into VFR conditions.
The most frequent reasons were that the 180 degree turn was not feasible, due
to adverse weather closing in or ground fog (7), landing at an enroute air-
port (6), or requesting IFR or special VFR clearances (5). Apparently in
these incidents the failure to make the recommended 180 degree turn was jus-
tified by the situation or the pilot's action. Many of the pilots requested
assistance from a ground facility when encountering the adverse weather con-
dition. Analysis of the narratives indicated that 33 pilots requested assis-
tance, 16 did not ask for help, and, in 3 incidents, it could not be deter-
mined whether they requested assistance. Table 13 shows the type of service
requested and provided.
In two-thirds of the requests for assistance, service was provided by
the ground facility. The majority of the services consisted of radar vectors
to the destination airport, an alternate airport, or VFR weather. In one-
third of the requests, however, the pilot was unable to obtain assistance.
This was often due to inability to contact the desired facility (4 incidents)
or the difficulty of obtaining an IFR or SVFR clearance (4 incidents). This
latter situation may have been related to the controller's workload.
The recoveries or outcomes of these incidents are shown in Table 14.
The most frequent recoveries were the pilot landing at an enroute airport
(I0), or receiving vectors to his destination or enroute airport (9). In
three incidents the weather was such that the pilot had to be given an ASR or
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TABLE13. WHETHERSERVICEPROVIDEDANDTYPEOF
SERVICEGIVENORDENIED
Service Provided Reason Service Not Provided
Vectors to Airport or
Landing 12
Vectors to VFR
Weather or Deviations 4
IFR or SVFR
Clearance Issued 2
EmergencyClimb or
Could Not Contact
ATCor FSS 4
Request for IFR or
SVFRDenied 4
Too Low for Radar Coverage 1
Delay in Granting SVFR
Descent Through
Clouds 3
Weather Update 1
Total 22
Clearance 1
ATCWould Not Provide
Clearance 1
II
PAR approach. There were 6 incidents in which flight was continued to the
destination airport because the pilot broke out into VMC or continued in the
poor weather. The 7 incidents in which no recovery factor was indicated
involved such things as pilots entering ATAs without clearance, landing at
their destination below VFR minimums, and misunderstanding clearances.
In many of the incidents the situation or the pilot's action resulted in
an unsafe condition, as shown in Table 15. The most frequent unsafe condi-
tion was the non-instrument rated pilot flying IMC. In some cases the con-
cern was whether the pilot could control the aircraft and follow the
controller's instructions. In other incidents, however, the pilot was not in
contact with ATC which, in addition to the aforementioned control hazard,
posed a threat to IFR traffic. Six incidents involved pilots flying in or
through clouds and fog, and not in contact with an ATC facility. Penetration
of airport traffic areas, approach corridors, and other controlled airspace
without clearance (7 incidents) also produced a threat to other aircraft,
especially under conditions of restricted visibility.
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TABLE14. RECOVERYFACTORSOFVFRPILOTSIN IMC CONDITIONS
Landed Enroute Airport ......... i0
Vectored to Airport .......... 9
Continued Flight ............ 6
Landed at Destination ......... 6
ASRor PARApproach .......... 3
Broke Out on Top ............ 3
Vectored to VFRWeather ........ 2
Other ................. 6
ro
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TABLE 15. UNSAFE CONDITIONS CREATED BY VFR FLIGHT
IN ADVERSE WEATHER
VFR in IMC
(In contact with ATSS) .......... I0
VFR in Clouds or Fog
Not in Contact with ATC ......... 6
Penetrated ATA or Other
Controlled Airspace Without Clearance • • 7
ATC Assist Required ........... 4
Landed Without Reporting:
Airport IMC ............... 3
Landed Below VFR Minimums ........ 2
Lost, Unsure of Position ......... 2
Non-instrument Rated
Pilot Making Instrument Approach ..... 2
Other ................... 5
None ................... I0
In four incidents ATC assists were required for an ASR or PAR approach,
or vectors to the runway. While not necessarily a hazard to other aircraft,
the safety of the flight in such cases is contingent upon ability of the
22
pilot and the controller. There were several ineldents (8) in which no
threat to safety was involved. In several of these the pilots saw the
deteriorating weather and madea 180 degree turn or landed at an enroute air-
port when the weather started to deteriorate while the airport was still
under VMC. In two of these incidents the pilot heard on the radio frequency
he was monitoring that weather ahead was deteriorating and landed before
encountering the weather.
Somepilots (I0) reported taking off in IMC. Seven of these obtained
SVFR clearances. There seems to be someconfusion about SVFRclearances
amongthe reporters. Somepilots, finding the weather below VFR minimums,
asked for a SVFRto depart and continued to their destination in IMC, or at
best, marginal VMC. (See the "Special Issues, Special VFRIncidents" subsec-
tion). Three pilots apparently departed under VFRin IMC.
There were only two pilots who reported poor or incomplete weather
briefings. In someof the other incidents the briefings mayhave been incom-
plete, but this is not apparent from the narratives. There were two
incidents in which the pilot did not check the weather. Oneof these
involved a pilot shooting night landings. The other involved a pilot who had
flown earlier when the weather was VMC,so he did not check weather for his
next flight.
In most of the incidents (31) the pilot was able to get himself out of
the situation by returning to VMC,landing at an enroute airport, or finding
VMC. In 16 incidents, however, the pilot required assistance from ATC or
flight service for landing or finding VMC.
Generalizations
What insights can be gained from this examination of incidents involving
VFR pilots in adverse weather? The typical scenario is as follows: the
pilot checked the weather with flight service and the forecast was for VFR.
He took off and either encountered low visibility conditions or a cloud deck
closing in beneath him. He continued in IMC or marginal IMC before electing
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to execute a return to VMC. He then landed at an enroute airport or received
an assist from ATCfor vectors to his destination airport or an alternate.
Meteorology is not an exact science. Sometimes weather will be better
than forecast and sometimesit will be worse. Somepilots may place too much
faith in the forecast and believe that the deteriorating weather is just a
local condition and/or that good VFR weather is Just down the road. Even
when the forecast is for good VFR a pilot should have an alternative course
of action in case the weather turns sour.
There is need for pilots to become more familiar with the mechanics of
weather observation, and the nature of the forecasts. To prepare for a safe
flight, and to be aware of options available in case of an encounter with
adverse weather, pilots must understand both the value and the limitations of
weather information dissemination systems.
Another problem involves the issue of legal versus practical VFR. A
pilot may legally fly in controlled airspace when the reported visibility is
as low as three miles, yet he cannot see an airport until he is within the
airport traffic area. In such situations the slant visibility may be even
less than three miles. At this pont he may become a potential conflict with
IFR traffic.
One of the most important issues is the need for more timely weather
information to be available to pilots. More PIREPS should be encouraged,
even in good weather, and especially for enroute areas where no weather
reporting facilities are available. There needs to be better coordination
between ATC and FSS for relaying weather information. Many PIREPS are
reported to enroute, approach, and departure control facilities that may not
be relayed to flight service for dissemination to pilots. Unfortunately,
when the weather begins to deteriorate is when the controllers are the busi-
est but also when such reports are most needed.
Pilots flying under VFR, especially on long cross-country flights, are
often uncertain of the frequencies they should monitor in order to be alerted
to deteriorating or other weather changes. Should they monitor Center, FSS,
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or EFASfrequencies? Pilots should be better indoctrinated on the sources of
such information.
MULTIPLEAIRCRAFTWEATHER-RELATEDASRSREPORTS
Introduction
One might expect that most reported events involving multiple aircraft
would address potential conflicts. This expectation is upheld; 55 out of 65
reported incidents in the non-commercial weather data set being considered
are classed as potential conflicts. (Due to multiple reporting, these 65
incidents are described in 77 separate ASRS reports).
A second expectation is that potential conflicts may be closely related
to weather problems, due to reduced visibility and heavier pilot workloads.
That expectation is not supported by the data. The percentages of potential
conflict and near mid-air collision reports contained in the weather-related
subset are nearly identical to the percentages in the entire ASRS data base.
The weather factor does not appear to raise significantly the frequency of
potential conflicts, as noted in Table 16.
TABLE 16. POTENTIAL CONFLICT FREQUENCY
Total File (21,871) Weather Subset (175)
I.....
PotentialConflicts 6977 (32 percent)
Potential Conflicts-SMA 3308 (15 percent)
Near Mid-Air Collisions 1799 ( 8 percent)
Near Mid-Air
Collisions-SMA 1284 ( 6 percent)
67 (38 percent)
34 (19 percent)
16 ( 9 percent)
12 ( 7 percent)
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If multiple reports of the same event are deleted, the potential con-
flict weather subset percentage (34 percent) is even closer to the total
data base percentage.
It is also interesting to note in Table 16 that small aircraft (SMA) do
not appear to be any more heavily involved in potential conflicts in
weather-related reports than they are with all reports of potential con-
flicts.
Typical scenarios for multiple aircraft events differ significantly
between those in which both aircraft are under ATC jurisdication and those in
which only one or neither is talking to ATC. When both aircraft are on IFR
flight plans, all participants are well identified and the details of the
encounter are well documented. Encounters under mixed flight rule opera-
tions, on the other hand, often depend upon the observation of a single
reporter, who may be accusing others of misbehavior. The reported facts may
not be verifiable by a second party and often appear subject to interpreta-
tion. For these reasons, the following analyses separate multiple aircraft
events into two sets: one, in which all aircraft are on IFR flight plans and
a second, in which one or more aircraft may be operating outside the IFR sys-
tem.
IFR/IFR Incidents
Multiple aircraft events in the set of ASRS reports examined here in
which all aircraft are operating under IFR flight plans are reported
exclusively by controllers; such events often lead to multiple reports.
Among 34 ASRS reports in this category, there are only 23 separate events,
all reported by controllers. Because this set of reports is the exclusive
contribution of controllers, relatively little is known about pilot qualifi-
cations. Of 47 aircraft involved, 10 are assumed to be commanded by an ATP
rated pilot and 10 others are commanded by pilots known to hold instrument
ratings. The qualifications of the remaining 27 pilots are not reported.
Furthermore, no information is reported about any of the 47 pilots" total
flying time or recent flight experience.
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The aircraft type involved in IFR/IFR incidents is heavily dominated by
small transports (SMT) with 23 of 47, or nearly 50 percent, being in that
class (SMT-FAR135 limit, 5000-14,000 Ibs.).
Small aircraft (SMA)involvement is minimal with only 2 reported among
the 47 (SMA-less than 5000 Ibs.). The remaining aircraft are scattered among
the heavier classes and are most often air carrier type equipment.
Weather Factors
In spite of the fact that all aircraft involved in this subset of events
were on IFR flight plans, only 12 of the 23 events (52 percent) occurred in
instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). Six of the 23 events (26 per-
cent) actually occurred in good visibility with the remainder in marginal
visual meteorological conditions.
There is no evidence that these events were precipitated by flight
crews' inability to deal effectively with weather problems. However, there
is evidence that these events may be closely related to failure of the total
system to deal effectively with at least one major weather problem, namely
thunderstorms. Of the 23 events, 12 involve thunderstorm encounters. Such
encounters typically lead to weather diversion maneuvers, (i.e., diversion
from flight plan route) which, in turn, culminate in lack of separation
through lack of controller communication or coordination.
The domination of thunderstorm activity in these reports is reflected in
two other statistics: time of day and month of year. Seventeen of the 23
events (74 percent) occurred between 1200 and 1800, and 15 of the 23 (65 per-
cent) occurred during the summermonths of June, July, and August. These
patterns differ significantly from the total ASRSdata base, but are con-
sistent with the heavy involvement of thunderstorms.
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Problem Nature
One report narrative in the IFR/IFR subset is paraphrased as follows:
"Air Carrier Aircraft A, inbound to the terminal via J60,
was deviating right of course for weather. Whenhe could
finally return to course, coordination was accomplished
with the next sector for a delay vector for sequencing.
This put A's projected path in conflict with GA Aircraft
B, descending through the altitude of A. B was told to
stop above A, but the controller transferred communica-
tions to the next sector without listening for a readback
from B. B continued to descend and passed through the
altitude of A with approximately one mile lateral separa-
tion. Traffic was heavy and complex with sequencing of
inbound aircraft, which were deviating from course due to
weather."
This narrative contains several of the problem elements evident
throughout the IFR/IFR subset. Weather deviations, heavy workloads, communi-
cation difficulties, controller coordination, and mixed operating phases
(cruise by one aircraft and descent by the other in this case) all play a
part in this narrative. Not every narrative is so rich in detail, but nearly
all have one or more of these sameproblem-causing elements.
The nature of the problem is potential conflict between two IFR air-
craft. Seventeen of 23 events are coded as potential conflicts. Five of the
remaining 6 are saved from that designation only because the aircraft
involved happenednot to violate less-than-standard separation requirements,
even though the conditions were such that only by chance (or sometimes by
controller vigilance) was it prevented. These intrusions into occupied air-
space most often occur during mixed operating phases, e.g., one aircraft
cruising, while the second descends or climbs. Seventeen of 23 events occur
in such mixed phases. It is also worth noting that only one occurs when both
aircraft are in cruise phase and four occur when both are climbing. Although
13 cases (57 percent) occur between i000 and I0,000 ft. altitude, a signifi-
cant number 8 (35 percent) take place above i0,000 feet. The events are
split nearly equally in terms of the responsible ATC controlling agency.
Eleven occur while under the jurisdiction of an air route traffic control
center, and 12 while controlled by a TRACONor tower facility.
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Problem Causes
The generation of nearly every IFR/IFR event reported begins with some
combination of the following three factors:
I. Weather diversions by one or more aircraft (56 percent).
2. Difficulties in coordinating handoffs between controllers
(70 percent).
3. Violation of ATCclearances by flight crews (49 percent).
Indeed, as the following paraphrased report indicates, all three factors
may be present at once.
"Aircraft A was climbing to FL280; B was climbing to
FL350 out of 290 under control of ZDC. A few minutes
later, B was handed off to ZID climbing to 350 on J149.
At this point, B was 5 west of EKNVORand A was over EKN
VOR. Aircraft A was cleared to FL350. A rogered and
climbed. ZOB then called and said stop A at FL310.
Meanwhile, ZID controller turned B to deviate around
weather without advising ZDC. Transmissions to stop A at
FL310went unanswered. At a point 20 north of EKN, A
called ZDCand was told to descend immediately to FL310.
About 20 seconds later A reports level at FL350. These
aircraft were together 3 or 4 times before being resolved
by ZOBand ZDC."
This report noted ATCas the primary problem code, even though it shows
elements of both ATCand FLC (flight crew) shortcomings. It all began when
one controller authorized a weather deviation for an aircraft near the boun-
dary of three different sectors without advising the other controllers. The
problem was then complicated by communication difficulties, violation of
altitude restrictions, and an uncoordinated climb. Weather diversion, con-
troller coordination, and violation of ATCclearances all contributed to this
potential conflict.
j_
The three causes are mentioned in the ASRS report
following frequencies:
Weather Diversions
Controller Coordination -
Clearance Violations
13 (56 percent)
16 (70 percent)
I! (49 percent)
narratives with the
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However, as noted in the report above, it is often the combination of
these enabling factors which leads to a reportable event. In the present set
of 13 weather diversion cases, i! (85 percent) involve controller coordina-
tion difficulties. This indicates that ASRSreports are often generated, not
so much because of the weather, but rather because of controller coordination
problems arising from attempts to accommodatediversions from flight planned
routes.
Recovery Factors
The 23 reports under discussion all related to potential disasters.
Pure chance appears to have saved at least 9 in which no recovery factor was
noted. In 12 of the remaining cases, controller intervention resolved the
problem. Pilot vigilance was responsible for recovery in two cases. There
was some evidence in the narratives that auxiliary warning systems, which
supplement radar tracking, play an important role in recovery. The activa-
tion of a conflict alert alarm was mentioned in 6 cases as the means by which
controllers became aware that there were potential problems.
Generalizations
The multiple IFR aircraft reports stem from potential conflicts between
small transport and larger aircraft. Small aircraft do not play a signifi-
cant role. Problems are created by weather diversions, complicated con-
troller coordination procedures, and misunderstandings of ATC clearances.
Mixed Flight Rule Events
Although 35 of 42 reports (83 percent) involve one IFR aircraft, multi-
ple aircraft events in which one or more of the participants are not operat-
ing under IFR flight plans differ decidedly from the previously discussed
IFR/IFR events. The reporter is more likely to be a pilot than a controller
(55 percent pilots, 45 percent controllers), whereas in the IFR/IFR case all
reporters are controllers. Often, qualifications of only one pilot are
reported (27 out of 42 pilots are identified by rating). Of the 22 out of 27
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pilots who report flying experience, as well as ratings, 17 (77 percent)
claim more more than 1500hours total flying time, and most of them claim
over 30 hours in the last 90 days.
the non-reportlng, unidentified
reports.
Weknow nothing of the qualifications of
pilots, who are often the targets of the
The small aircraft types (SMA)tend to dominate mixed flight rule events
with 53 (63 percent) of the 84 aircraft reported being SMA. This is markedly
different from the IFR/IFR case, in which only 4 percent were SMA. Sixteen
small transports (19 percent) are reported, with the remaining aircraft dis-
tributed amongthe heavier classes of equipment.
Weather Factors
A high proportion of the mixed flight rule events were reported to have
occurred in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC): 26 out of 42 (62
percent). Since only 3 (7 percent) were reported to be in VMC, the total
marginal weather plus IMC reports account for 93 percent of the reported
events. This contrasts in an unexpected way with the IFR/IFR events, in
which 26 percent were reported to have occurred under visual meteorological
conditions (VMC).
Contrary to the predominanceof thunderstorm activity in the IFR/IFR
case, the mixed flight rule events show no particular in-flight weather
encounters beyond clouds and precipitation. Thirty-eight out of 42 (90 per-
cent) of the events list no in-flight encounter, and only 3 (7 percent) are
related to thunderstorm activity. The most common obscuration factor is
"fog" with 19 reports (45 percent). This classification includes both ground
fog and cloud encounters. Rain or snow are reported 8 times (19 percent) and
haze is noted 5 times (12 percent). Flight visibility of less than 3 miles
is noted in 14 reports (33 percent). Ceiling of less than I000 feet is noted
8 times (19 percent).
One troublesome aspect of the reported weather statistics is that they
often originate with an IFR pilot who has encountered another aircraft while
flying in conditions which he, the IFR pilot, judges to be below VFR
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minimums. In somecases, this is a judgement call, with which the non-
reporting pilot might not agree. In marginal weather, it seemspossible for
two persons of good faith to have honest differences of opinion, with one
Judging conditions to be IMC while the other calls it VMC. The following
paraphrased narrative taken from the ASRS data illustrates the point as
reported by the pilot of aircraft A.
"Aircraft A was northbound on V-23 on an IFR flight plan,
flying in snow with a visibility of less than a mile.
Aircraft B passed to my right about 1/4 mile away -- not
at a VFRaltitude, VFRin weather that was definitely IMC
-- only chance prevented a midair. The pilot of Aircraft
B was obviously at fault."
The reporting pilot (IFR) in this case, had 400 hours total flying time.
The non-reporting VFRpilot was also in contact with ATCand was reported to
have delayed an expected climb from the altitude in question in order to
remain in VMC. Lacking corroborative reports from either the controller or
the VFRpilot, there seemsto be room to question whether the conditions were
as poor or the encounter as close as the relatively inexperienced IFR pilot
estimated.
Discounting those events in which an IFR pilot is reporting on other
traffic which he judges to be in violation, there is still a group (9 in 42 -
21 percent) of events which seemto point to failure of pilots to deal effec-
tively with a weather problem. For the most part these involve VFRpilots
proceeding into weather beyond their capabilities and at some point
encountering another aircraft or causing traffic disruption. The following
narrative illustrates this point.
"VFR aircraft in the control zone (IMC) was told to
depart to south. Turned northwest and crossed in front
of IFR aircraft on localizer. IFR aircraft had to be
pulled out of approach. VFRaircraft asked for vectors
back to airport. Tower was unable due to no radar. VFR
finally landed with VFR controller's assistance. IFR
aircraft was delayed.
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Problem Nature
The nature of the mixed flight rule events is again that of potential
conflict. Thirty-eight of 42 events (90 percent) are so classified.
Twenty-nine (69 percent) of the events occur in the vicinity of airports with
the remainder (31 percent) occurring during the enroute phase. Thirty-five
(83 percent) of the reports involve an encounter between an IFR and other
(presumed to be VFR) aircraft. Four more (10 percent) involved special VFR
(SVFR) and IFR aircraft encounters for a total of 93 percent of the reported
events occurring whenat least one aircraft is under direct control of ATC.
Ninety-five percent of the reported events occur in daylight hours.
The role of the small aircraft (SMA) in mixed flight encounters is
highlighted by Table 17. Note that not only do most of the encounters
involve at least one SMA(83 percent), but also that 40 percent of the events
involve two SMA's.
TABLE17. AIRCRAFTYPESIN MIXEDFLIGHTPLANENCOUNTERS
°.
SMA
SMT
OTHER
SMA
(Percent)
17 (40)
m
SMT
(Percent)
8 (19)
2 (05)
m
OTHER
(Percent)
i0 (24)
4 (I0)
1 (02)
Total
(Percent)
35 (83)
6 (14)
1 (02)
An analysis of the narratives does not yield an overwhelming majority
for the "typical" scenario, as it did in the IFR/IFR case. Rather, mixed
flight rule events seem to stem from a variety of problems. If there are
common denominators, they must be:
I. Entering control zone without clearance when the weather
is below VFR minimums, 17 events (40 percent).
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VFR flight in (reported) IMC, 23 events (55 percent).
Surprise encounters with aircraft popping through holes
in clouds, maneuvering around broken clouds, or cruising
near cloud decks being penetrated by IFR aircraft, 12
events (29 percent).
A given scenario may involve one or more of these factors.
Again, the statistics on IMC identification and estimation of encounter
distances must be tempered by the knowledge that they originate from single,
possibly biased, reporters.
As was the case with the IFR/IFR events, the mixed flight rule
encounters most often occurred during mixed flight phases; 24 out of 42
events (57 percent). An additional 11 (26 percent) occurred with both air-
craft in the traffic pattern or on approach. Only 4 events (I0 percent)
occurred when both aircraft were in cruise mode.
The mixed flight rule events are primarily low altitude phenomonon, with
I0 reported under 1000 feet and 26 between 1000 and I0,000 for a total of 86
percent of all reports. The controlling agency is also reflected in the
altitude structure, with ARTCC involvement in only 8 of 42 cases (19 per-
cent). The other com_unlcation facilities are spread among TRACON, tower,
FSS and UNICOM.
Contributing Factors
An examination of the narratives reveals the presence of one or more
a variety of contributing factors:
I. Weather interpretation - 21 events (50 percent).
2. Controller coordination - I0 events (24 percent).
3. Regulation knowledge and interpretation - I0 events (24
percent).
4. Clearance violations - 9 events (21 percent).
5. Weather encounters beyond a pilot's capabilities - 9
events (21 percent).
of
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As previously suggested, the outcomes of such contributing factors are
to cause a pilot to enter a control zone when the weather is below VFR
minimumswithout clearance (40 percent), to cause a second pilot to be
surprised by suddenencounters with another aircraft close to clouds (29 per-
cent), or to cause a VFRflight to be operating in IMC (55 percent).
Weather interpretation causes ASRSreports to be filed for the following
reasons:
I. A VFRpilot maymisjudge visibilities and actually enter
IMC.
2. An IFR pilot may misjudge visibilities and report an
illegal VFRoperation when, in fact, VMCdoes exist.
3. A VFRpilot maymisjudge cloud clearance distances and
actually be too close to clouds.
4. An IFR pilot maymisjudge cloud clearance distances and
report an offending VFR operation which is, in fact,
legal.
5. Ground observers and a VFRpilot may disagree on prevail-
ing ceiling and visibility, causing a VFRflight to enter
a control zone in reported IMC. For example, the visi-
bility value which is reported is that which prevails
over 51 percent of the 360-degree horizon visible from
the observing point. Thus, an airport may be below VFR
minimumsdue to low visibility values over 51 percent of
the area. A pilot, however, may be approaching the field
from a quadrant where the visibility is better, have the
airport in sight, and does not realize that the field is
IMC. He consequently proceeds to land without concern
for "legality".
Unfortunately, the weather interpretation factor is one in which con-
flicting opinions can only be inferred and, most often, are not available for
explicit analysis. The suspicion that conditions may not be exactly as
reported is raised when a pilot reports in one narrative, "... I was on solid
instruments at that altitude", yet advises radar that he has the traffic. It
seems plausible that the pilot of the offending VFR aircraft might have
believed conditions were VMC and was following visual separation procedures.
Controller/pilot communication factors may appear when adjacent facili-
ties have different reported weather. A VFR aircraft may be cleared
(legally) out of one jurisdiction, only to enter a second which is reporting
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IMC and ultimately causes a potential conflict. The following synopsis
involving a VFR departure which entered a neighboring control zone reported
to be below VFR minimums illustrates such a problem:
"LAX was VMC, HHR, adjoining airport IMC. Helicopter A
departed LAX VFR. Later light aircraft on approach to
HHR reported NMAC with A. A was outside TCA and no
longer in contact with LAX tower."
Knowledge and interpretation of regulations may be factors in potential
conflicts occurring in control zones which are not served by towers. Con-
sider the following excerpts from a narrative, in which the field had a
flight service station, but no control tower:
"Aircraft A broke out on an ILS approach Just above
minimums and observed aircraft landing on same runway.
--He was not in communication with controlling authority
in a control zone that was IMC at the time."
The offending VFR pilot was illegally in the control zone, which was
below VFR minimums. He did not check with the FSS; either he was not radio
equipped or he did not know that a clearance was required when the visibility
was less than 3 miles. No communication would have been required if the con-
trol zone was in fact above VFR minimums.
A more subtle regulation factor occurs when an IFR approach is made to
an uncontrolled airport not in a control zone at which local operations are
being conducted below 700 feet in one mile visibility. Since, at many loca-
tions, that is uncontrolled airspace, the local VFR flights may be legal, but
may be a surprise to the arriving IFR pilot who breaks out at 700 feet to
face another aircraft in the pattern as noted in this narrative:
"With a ceiling of 700 ft. A GA Aircraft B was practicing
pattern work at what he said was 500 ft. AGL. I consider
it unsafe when we break out right at minimums on the cir-
cling approach, switch frequencies from approach to
UNICOM and hear B say he will do a 360 on crosswind to
avoid the jet. -- We all could have been dead right."
Clearance violations are contributing factors whenever failure to follow
instructions causes one aircraft to come in close proximity to another. The
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most commonviolation (5 events - 12 percent) seems to be for a VFRpilot to
change altitude or direction while in contact with ATCin marginal weather
without announcing his intentions.
Weather encounters beyond a pilot's capability include those in which a
pilot loses separation from clouds and requires special handling to complete
his flight. These become mixed flight rule events only when other flights
are delayed or diverted while the problem is resolved.
Recovery Factors
Pure chance, as evidenced by no recovery factor, appears to be the only
reason that 17 of the 42 mixed flight rule events (40 percent) did not lead
from potential to actual conflict. Pilots initiated recovery actions in 13
(31 percent) cases. These were most often self-initiated evasive maneuvers.
In the remaining 12 cases (29 percent), controller vigilance played a part in
resolving the mixed flight plan problems.
The majority of the mixed flight rule reports involve small aircraft
operations (SMA). The most numerous reports involve VFR flight in reported
IMC conditions and are filed by IFR pilots. Entering control zones without
proper clearance in IMC conditions and operating VFR in close proximity to
clouds, are also frequently mentioned. Weather interpretation, knowledge of
regulations, controller coordination and clearance violations are factors
which lead to the reported problems. A relatively small number of events
occur because of obvious inability of pilots to cope with weather encounters.
The data suggest the problem is more serious in MXD weather and when one
aircraft is climbing or descending.
WEATHER INFORMATION SERVICES
There were 14 complaints about weather information services other than
inaccurate forecasts where the pilot encountered IMC weather. The inability
to reach flight service by telephone was the complaint in 5 of the incidents.
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Reporters relate waits as long as 20 to 45 minutes on hold and then being
disconnected. This problem appears to be more prevalent in busy terminal
areas. Reporters allege that, because of the inability to reach flight ser-
vice, many pilots in their area depart without preflight weather briefings or
take off and contact enroute flight advisory service as illustrated in this
narrative:
"In this area it is practically impossible to obtain a
weather briefing by dialing the local phone numbersfor
the FSS. A phonecall to the local FSSat any time of
the day, morning or night, and in any kind of weather,
good or bad, will produce the sameresult of receiving a
recording which says that all lines are busy and a wait
of approximately 20 to 25 minutes. On more than one
occasion I have waited 30 to 45 minutes, only to have the
equipment disconnect my call, thereby causing me to re-
dial. My experience is also the experience of other peo-
ple in this area which I believe represents a dangerous
hazard to both VFRand IFR flight due to the inability of
the pilot to obtain a weather briefing. I have heard
pilots inform me that on more than one occasion flights
have been planned without a weather briefing because of
the inability to obtain a briefing on the ground. More
than one pilot has informed me that he will take off and
attempt to get flight watch on 122.0 in an attempt to
obtain a weather briefing to his destination. Simply
passing a law requiring a pilot to obtain a weather
briefing prior to flight and then making it impossible
for him to obtain a weather briefing does not improve
safety of flight and in fact encourages what eventually
must be an illegal operation by the pilot and which
represents a dangerous condition for all. From my own
personal observation the quality of the weather report
received from the FSS personnel is spotty and incon-
sistent with the experienced people giving you an excel-
lent report and the inexperienced people giving you a
broad brush that for all practical purposes is valueless.
Whenthe weather is good, everyone gives you a good
report, but when the weather is bad I have found it is
always necessary to talk directly to the weather person-
nel. I have attended many safety seminars put on by the
FAAwho are aware of the problem and have suggested sub-
mitting these danger reports to NAAfor their evaluation.
One pilot reported a systems problem where, after waiting on hold, the
line disconnected when the briefer answered. This appeared to be a recurrent
problem at this particular FSS. Three pilots complained of pessimistic fore-
• r
\
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casts issued by flight service. Two of these pilots cancelled flights
because of the forecasts when, in fact, the weather turned out to be VMC.
The other pilot took off in spite of the pessimistic forecast and completed
his flight without incident. In this later case, however, the forecast was
substantially correct and the pilot was fortunate enough to find breaks in
the overcast to climb to VFRon top and descend at his destination. There
were three complaints of incomplete briefings or lack of information. These
complaints involved lack of charts and radar summariesat self-brlefing
desks, automated systems being down, and lack of PIREP information. One
pilot suggested that, at terminal areas with approach and departure control,
every hour a departing aircraft, either GAor air carrier, be designated as a
PIREP aircraft. This aircraft could report cloud bases, tops, freezing
level, turbulence, etc. The information could then be relayed to flight ser-
vice, entered into the computer, and dispersed to FSSthroughout the system.
This could be effective in poor or rapidly changing weather conditions.
There were also three complaints of poor attitudes on the part of FSSor
NWS personnel. One pilot reported that NWSpersonnel refused to provide
weather information and even stood in front of the radar so that the pilot
could not see it.
The other complaints involved an inaccurate forecast and lack of weather
reporting facilities at the airport. r_
WEATHER-RELATED INCIDENTS INVOLVING BALLOONS
Five incidents involved hot-alr balloons. Four of these occurred
because the winds aloft differed from those forecast. One pilot landed to
avoid penetrating a TCA; another climbed to altitudes of 16,000-17,500 feet
without oxygen and crossed airways to overfly forested areas. The third
pilot flew at I00 feet AGL over a housing development to take advantage of
surface winds. The last pilot drifted into an airport traffic area and was
becalmed over the airport. All pilots and especially balloon pilots should
recognize that the winds aloft forecast is a computer generated forecast
based on the prevailing and projected pattern of high and low pressure areas
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and will often be different from actual conditions. While in most cases this
does not pose a problem for the pilot of a powered aircraft, who maymiss his
ETAby a few minutes, it can be a major problem for balloon pilots.
LIMITATIONS TO THE DATA
In the foregoing analysis it should be recognized that there are limita-
tions to the conclusions drawn from the ASRS data. Clearly, there is no evi-
dence on the representativeness of the data. For example: how many mixed
VFR/IFR potential conflicts go unreported? Are these unreported conflicts
substantially different in terms of inflight weather, mission phase, type of
aircraft, etc.?
It is well known that General Aviation pilots are not the usual report-
ers of incidents. General Aviation pilots comprise more than 90 percent of
all pilots in the USA and account for 75 percent of the total hours flown and
44 percent of the instrument approaches; yet they figure in only 29 percent
of the reported incidents (where GA operations include pleasure, corporate,
training, and personal business). Does this suggest that fewer GA pilots are
involved in incidents? The answer is probably that air carrier pilots are
motivated and encouraged to take an active role in the ASRS system in the
interest of increasing safety, they have ready access to reporting forms, and
probably are more likely to "cover" their performance inadequacies by an ASRS
report to avoid disciplinary action from the FAA. Incidents where pilots
confess to altitude deviations probably belong to this category. The same
might be said for air traffic controller reports of LTSS of two IFR aircraft.
While this may bias the data, the data still provide the analyst with
detailed descriptions of system problems.
Attitudes of pilots toward controllers (and vice versa), of air carrier
pilots toward General Aviation pilots (and vice versa), and of IFR pilots
toward VFR pilots (and vice versa) can be seen as underlying factors behind
some of the incidents reported. Again, this bias is important in understand-
ing the development and consequential effects of incidents. An example of
this is the following narrative:
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"I wason V233 tracking from the Roberts VORto Knox at
5000 ft and was with Chicago center. My first indication
of any weather was when I s_W l!BhtnlnB flash several
miles ahead and began hearing airli1._ &_kln_ t_ _ivert
..... left of course. I was told to climb to 7000rignL _
feet and ! asked the controller how the weather looked
along my line 6_ _li_nt and was told that I would pass to
the right of the storm. In a few minutes I saw that my
line of flight was taking me into the area of intense
lightning. I then asked the man for an update of my
position in relation to the storm. He then very sarcast-
ically told me 'I told you the weather was to your left,
divert to the right if you want to.' I immediately
turned right about 30 degs and was then handed off to
another frequency. Explained my situation and asked for
assistance. He was very helpful and diverted me farther
to the right to miss still another cell. The point of
this report is two-fold: No. l-please weed out sarcasm
in ATC. No. 2-please--let's be assured of some help from
the ground in weather situations. My flight originated
in Fort Worth, TX, where I checked with FSS twice on
weather conditions and once in flight with Decatur, IIi
radio thru the VOR. There was no report of any weather,
so I didn't knowingly get into the situation."
A basic issue is the relation of exposure frequency to incident fre-
quency. In other words, before one becomes awestruck by a statistic that
suggests that icing is a factor in IFR incidents, one must know the number of
pilot exposures to icing which were incident free. Thus, in drawing conclu-
sions from these data, one must recognize that, for the most part, there does
not exist sufficient exposure data to permit comparison of one incident type
to another.
Finally, all the incidents reported herein were selected because the
ASRS analyst reported that weather was a significant factor in the incident.
Indeed, in the case of the single IFR aircraft incidents, it has been argued
that weather should not have been a factor in a large percentage of these
cases because it was not unusual, i.e., it was IMC which the IFR system was
designed to handle. If the analyst can err on over-emphaslzlng the impor-
tance of weather, he can obviously also under-emphasize. In any event, this
source of error was probably trivial in comparison to the "exposure problem"
or the "representativeness problem" or to the "bias problem."
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v_t, d_spite the inability to know the true representativeness of the
ASRS data, it is evident that valuable insight into pilot-controller problems
has been gained.
SPECIAL ISSUES
Role of Increased Workload in General
Aviation Weather Incidents
One of the consequences of both deteriorating weather and sudden weather
changes is the impact on both pilot and controller workloads. The ASRS
analyst codes list excessive workload as a behavior factor which contributes
to some incidents. It was anticipated that this factor would be a signifi-
cant contributor in the reported General Aviation weather-related incidents,
yet there were few cases where this was indicated. In only 6 of the 175
reports was workload cited, and half of these involved air traffic controll-
ers. The problem might be the analyst interpretation of workload. One might
argue that most VFR pilots (at least low-time pilots) experience increased
workload with flight into adverse weather. It is difficult to ascertain how
excesslve such workloads might be, however. The VFR pilot in IMC usually
gets special handling, i.e., altitude and heading instructions from ATC.
To argue workload for the IFR pilot in IMC would seem to contradict the
idea of an instrument rating. A "good" pilot is expected to handle naviga-
tion, communication and maintain straight and level flight at the same time.
Icing, admittedly, could lead to stress which could enhance workload. Nei-
ther of the infllght icing incidents suggests any workload factor, however.
The fact that the small general aviation aircraft has, typically, less
sophisticated avionics, e.g., auto pilots, may be counteracted by the fact
that the pilot does not have the schedule pressures of air taxi, air carrier
crews, or corporate operations associated with more sophisticated aircraft.
The more likely case for workload-lnduced stress resides in the IFR/IFR
cases where weather-lnduced diversions lead to controller workload and coor-
dination problems between controllers. In summary, stress, workload,
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fatigue, and related concepts are difficult to ascertain after the fact.
Pilots and controllers may be reluctant to admit such behavioral factors
because they "suggest" an unprofessional pilot or controller. Perhaps no
post hoe reporting system can ever probe the degree to which weather-lnduced
stress influences a flight.
Problems With Obtaining Clearances in Flight
The results of this search of General Aviation pilots and weather-
related incidents revealed several instances of instrument-rated pilots
reporting difficulties in obtaining clearances in the air. Thls is illus-
trate_ by the following narrative:
:'After takeoff, ACFT A was still within the airport boun-
dary. FgS advised that the airport was now below VFR
minimums. I asked for a clearance but was told they
didn't have the zone, contact AN Center 119.09, center
was contacted and advised I was airborne and needed a
clearance. Center would not issue a clearance of any
kind (depart, hold, land) because there was an IFR Acft B
inbound. Again I advised I was airborne and needed to do
something so was circling the airport maintaining VFR
awaiting a clearance. Several times I asked for a clear-
ance, whereupon _TC Anchorage center gave me an IFR
clearance of "get the hell out of there." I continued to
circle the airport (at 800 ft with 30 miles visibility)
until I was given a proper ATC clearance. Time involved
approx 25 mln."
Often IFR rated pilots will go up and "take a VFR look" at marginal
weather, and assume that they can always get an IFR clearance if it appears
that they will need one. They seem surprised that controllers are often too
busy to oblige them immediately. Thls stems from lack of understanding of
three considerations:
i. If an airport becomes MVMC or turns IMC there will prob-
ably be an increase in IFR traffic.
2. The controller's primary job is to provide separation of
IFR traffic.
3. If the controller is already overloaded with separation
responsibilities, he may be loathe to accept new respon-
sibilities (at least, immediately).
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The upshot of thls situation is the case of a frustrated IFR rated pilot try-
ing to maintain VFR flight in rapidly deteriorating weather conditions in
controlled airspace. By not being under positive control, he then becomes a
potential hazard for other traffic.
One solution would be to file IFR even when weather is still reported
VMC -- a policy adopted by many pilots. This practice could, of course, over-
load the IFR system and, hence, create additional problems. A balanced
approach would be to let each pilot decide on the basis of weather and
traffic in his area of operation. If he can hold VFR above a cloud deck for
an IFR clearance, there is little problem. The problem develops when he is
faced with visibility interpretations on arrival or on take off. Here the
dilemma of two versus three miles visibility estimation appears. Because of
the lack of obvious solutions to this problem, it would appear to be a candi-
date for systematic research.
Weather Incidents at Night
One of the concerns of aviation safety specialists is the combined
effect of weather and night operations, particularly for the VFR pilot. Mar-
ginal VFR in daylight is considered by some to be IMC at night where there is
a paucity of visual cues for the pilot. Even scattered layers may cause air-
ports to go un-notlced at night. Examination of the 177 ASPS reports reveal
that only 12 incidents were under night conditions, and for VFR into IMC only
4 incidents or 8 percent of that type were reported as occurring at night.
This does not suggest that the night weather problem does not exist; it may
only suggest that such cases are not being reported. Lack of such reports
may be due to a combination of factors such as:
a) Night flying, especially VFR, is much less frequent than
daytime flying (the exposure issue).
b) Pilots who fly at night may have more experience and more
sophisticated aircraft, and are less likely to find them-
selves in a weather-related incident, or better able to
cope with weather.
c) The air traffic control system is less crowded and is
better able to accept devlatons without system disruption
at night.
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d) Pilots, in general, demand better weather for night
operation than for daytime operation.
Special VFR Incidents
Eight incidents involved special VFR clearances. In several cases, upon
flight continuance, the pilot discovered deteriorating rather than improving
weather. Some "specials" were filed to reach satellite airports. The fol-
lowing incident illustrates one kind of problem resulting from SVFR clear-
ances:
"I received permission to depart Wichita Falls special
VFR. During climb out (at approx 500-600") I could see
at a distance of one mile in front of me. The ceiling
going down--I immediately decided this was not for me and
decided upon a 180 deg turn back to the airport. How-
ever, due to commercial traffic, I decided that the tower
should be notified of my decision. Before initiating the
turn, I radioed the tower twice, with no response (radios
were set up correctly). Next contact attempt was to
departure with the same results. Felt an emergency (lost
comm) was necessary and continued a 500" climb into
clouds as opposed to 180 deg turn or flying lower. A
commercial jet was preparing to depart when I departed.
At 3500 MSL I broke on top and 2-3 minutes later Wichita
Falls transmitted to me (no apparent problems now). I
felt the climb was the safest choice -- also due for IFR
checkrlde on (date). Continued flight to Dallas with no
problems."
Pilots need to have a better understanding of SVFR. Perhaps the pres-
ence of VOR receivers leads pilots to undertake trips in such weather condi-
tions where pilotage would be impossible.
Whether special VFR's lead VFR pilots into problems excessively cannot
be answered with these data without knowledge of successful VFR pilot use of
SVFR clearances. For example, how many SVFR clearances are issued each year,
and under what conditions -- localized ground fog or general low visibility
conditions? How many pilots return to airports immediately after SVFR depar-
tures with special assistance from controllers? How many special VFR clear-
ances are denied and for what reasons? Clearly, SVFR clearances can invite
some pilots into unsafe conditions. The data suggest that research be done
45
in this area to ascertain the value of SVFR, the percent of time difficulties
result, and the comparison between the benefits versus the costs of this pro-
cedure to the aviation system.
Weather Involvement and General Aviation
Operations in the Vicinity of Airports
iN
Operations conducted in the vicinity of airports provide many opportuni-
ties to generate potential conflicts among aircraft. The airports are col-
lection points for arriving aircraft and dispersion points for departing air-
craft. This natural opportunity for conflict is increased when IFR and VFR
operations are mixed during periods of marginal weather. Three factors con-
tribute to enhanced conflict potential:
i. Operating rules, involving weather minimums and
cation requirements, differ among airports.
2. Ceiling and visibility estimates are difficult to
and may differ among observers.
3. The transition from VFR to IFR operation may occur
no time or space buffers.
communi-
make
with
Table 18 summarizes the airspace types in 27 reports of mixed flight
rule events which originate in the vicinity of airports.
l
Instrument approaches may be available at four different classes of air-
ports. The first class includes the major terminals protected by TCA (Termi-
nal Control Area) airspace. These areas are well charted and the equipment
and operating requirements to enter that airspace are widely publicized. ATC
authorization is required to operate in a TCA, regardless of weather condi-
tions. Conflicts in these areas are most likely to be caused by clearance
violations, intruders, or controller errors.
The second class includes those airports with operating control towers,
but no TCA. Again, the airport traffic area (a cylinder of airspace 5 miles
in radius and 3000 feet high) should be well understood by all pilots. No
one legally approaches the airport served by the control tower without com-
municating with ATC.
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TABLE18. ASRSREPORTSFORMIXEDFLIGHTRULE
TRAFFICIN THEVICINITY OFAIRPORTS
Location
Terminal Control Area
Airport Traffic Area
Control Zone
Airport in Uncontrolled Airspace
Total in Vicinity of Airports
Numberof
of Airports
3
12
7
5
27
Percent
of Total
(42 Reports)
7
19
17
12
64
The third class of airports consists of those lying in control zones,
but without operating control towers. This appears to be the group with the
most confusing operating rules. The stated weather minima for VFRoperations
in a control zone are I000 feet ceiling and 3 miles visibility. The confu-
sion arises because pilots are not required to communicate with ATC to
operate at these airports in VFRconditions. This leads the VFRpilot to
believe that he is flying in an uncontrolled environment. Unless there is a
flight service station on the field and the pilot is participating in the
airport advisory program, an arriving VFRaircraft could enter a control zone
which is officially below minimums, communicating with no one, in weather he
judges to be VMC. At the same time an IFR aircraft on approach may be
(falsely) counting on ATCto assure separation from all traffic, since he is
in controlled airspace that is officially below VFRminimums. The conflict
potential escalates.
The fourth class of airports consists of those with approved instrument
approaches, but no control towers or control zones. Controlled airspace at
these airports ends at 700 feet above ground level (AGL). Below 700 feet is
uncontrolled airspace in which VFR requirements are 1 mile visibility and
clear of the clouds. An approaching IFR aircraft flying in IMC moves from
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separation by ATCfrom all other legal traffic to no protection, beyond
visual separation, as it descends below 700 feet. The potential for con-
fllct, with perfectly legal VFRoperations just below the ceiling, is obvi-
ous. Marion, Ohio is typical of such airports. Marion has a VORapproach
with a minimumdescent altitude of 490 feet AGL, yet controlled airspace
there ends at 700 feel AGL. There are no time or space buffers between the
IFR and VFRworlds at such locations.
Weather interpretation and non-unlform operating rules combine to
increase the potential conflict hazard in mixed IFR/VFRoperations at air-
ports in classes 3 and 4 to a greater degree than in classes 1 and 2.
Any airport with an operating control tower (classes 1 and 2) has a
qualified weather observer who has direct communication with all aircraft
legally entering the airspace in the vicinity of the airport. All players
should know the ground rules. Current weather is, for example: "800 feet
and 2 miles" -- because the tower says it is.
Airports in control zones, but without control towers, may also have
qualified weather observers present, but they may not be talking to all the
participants. The IFR pilot knows the rules because he is in communication
with ATC and has been told that the weather is below i000 feet and/or 3
miles. The VFRpilot, on the other hand, must either contact the flight ser-
vice station, if one is on the field, or rely on his own judgement to deter-
mine whether or not VFRminimumsexist. There is no mandatory communication
in VMCweather. Honest differences lead to a violation of "VFR in IMC" and a
potential eonfllct with IFR traffic.
Airports with instrument approaches which lle in uncontrolled airspace
(below 700 feet AGL) and lack qualified weather observers rely entirely on
the Judgementof the participants to establish the operating ground rules. A
VFR pilot can legally operate at such airports as long as he estimates the
v_slbility to be greater than | mile and he remains clear of the clouds. An
arriving IFR flight might disagree with the visibility assessment of hls VFR
counterpart if both meet on the final approach to landing. The two pilots
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are operating under different assumedrules because they lack a commoninfor-
mation source.
A second weather-related problem, which does not involve conflicting
estimates, occurs at airports in uncontrolled airspace. This is the poten-
tial conflict between an arriving IFR flight which breaks out of the overcast
below 700 feet AGL and a VFR flight operating very close to, but clear of,
the clouds. There is no buffer to accommodate the changeover from total
reliance on radar separation to a see and be seen doctrine. Perhaps further
research is warranted to assess the impact of raising approach minima at such
airports, so that the MDA (minimum descent altitude) is always in controlled
airspace (e.g., above 700 feet, AGL). That way all participants would be
operating under the same rules (VFR) at a well defined altitude. As it is
now, an approach with an MDA of 500 feet terminates 200 feet into uncon-
trolled airspace. At least if ground contact was required before entering
uncontrolled airspace, some buffer would be created to accommodate the
changeover from an IFR to a VFR environment.
CONCLUSIONS
In general, the analysis of weather-related incidents involving general
aviation did not indicate glaring deficiencies in skill or training of the GA
pilot. While some pilots may have needed help from a ground-based facility,
all but one of the pilots landed safely without damaging the aircraft. There
was, also, little indication that the lack of equipment contributed to any of
the reported incidents.
The major problems may be ranked as follows:
I. Lack of timely weather information, especially in
deteriorating weather.
2. Lack of exact weather interpretation, e.g., visibility
reports.
3. Questionable judgement and attitude of pilots in regard
to weather flying.
4. Pilot attentiveness.
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5. Aircraft equipment.
6. Navalds.
7. ATCSystem.
In regard to single IFR aircraft, the problem causes appear to be:
I. Violation of rules or lack of precision in IFR flying.
2. Weather interpretation, i.e., the classic issue of when
conditions have deteriorated from VMCto IMC.
3. Communicationsbreakdowns between FSS, controllers, and
pilots.
4. Poor preflight planning by pilots.
The problem causes for the VFRpilot encountering adverse weather appear
to be as follows:
I. Weather turns out to be worse than forecast.
2. Pilots departing VFRin marginal weather conditions.
3. Lack of timely weather information or enroute weather
(between stations) e.g., PIREPS.
4. Poor pre-fllght planning by pilots.
5. Failure of pilots to initiate 180 degree turns soon
enough when the weather is worse than forecast•
In the incidents involving multiple aircraft, the major problems were
related to the difficulty of coping with non-routine operations during
weather diversions and the hazard created by two or more aircraft operating
on mixed flight rules and mixed flight phases in conditions of reduced visi-
bility.
These analyses suggest that improvements in the following areas may aid
in reducing future incidents involving GApilots and adverse weather•
i • Pilots
a. The need for better weather recognition, especially
estimates of visibility.
b. A more professional approach to IFR flying.
c. Better pre-fllght planning, especially in regard to
runway information during winter months and planning
alternatives in the event of weather changes.
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o
d. Need for fuller understanding of the mechanics of
weather observation and forecasting.
ATC
a,
be
Need to improve handling of non-routine events
caused by traffic diversions due to weather (sector
coordination problems).
Need for improved asistance to pilots confronting
deteriorating weather.
Weather Information Services
a. Need for more timely dissemination of weather infor-
mation.
b. Need to provide pilots with better access to weather
information for flight planning purposes.
Pilot - ATC Relations
a. The need to improve communication between pilots and
ATC as regards weather-related problems.
b. The need to understand better the attitudes of
pilots towards controllers (and vice versa) and how
these attitudes contribute to incident causation and
associated consequences. For example: if pilots
view controllers as policemen as opposed to
"helpers", they (the pilots) tend to be easily
offended, defensive, non-communicative, and in many
cases refuse to confess problems which can affect
the safety of others. In turn, controllers may lose
their professional composure and ....
The reduction of GA weather-related incidents does not appear to require
more experience for the General Aviation pilot, nor better equipment.
Aircraft equipment sophistication endorsed by some aviation safety advo-
cates appears not to be a factor _n incident causation. The lessons sug-
gested from the analyses provide additional evidence for curriculum design
for training both pilots and controllers and, at least minimally, remind all
General Aviation pilots of the potential
_7
The data suggest better utilization of the current resources of the avi-
ation system such as better weather information dissemination, better utili-
zation of the IFR system, and better training of VFR pilots to detect, diag-
nose, and cope with changing weather patterns.
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APPENDIXA.
ACCESSIONUMBERSUSED
Precedingpageblank
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The accession numbers on which this report is based are as follows:
8815
891o
8948
9188
9539
9847
9865
9931
9967
1o056
10200
10268
10281
10286
10328
10629
10714
10759
10769
10912
10939
11148
11/468
11634
11673
11744
11806
11876
11911
12136
12166
12211
12215
12216
12447
12484
12533
12589
12714
12726
12843
12.8.57
12876
13130
13288
13399
13419
13456 15733 20013
13608 15751 20014
13806 15900 20015
13840 15964 20016
13887 16136 20048
14008 16156 20198
14019 16206 20260
14162 16230 " 20480
14287 16264 20595
14439 16318 20667
14532 16392 20743
14582 16423 20782
14588 16504 20954
14589 16514 20986
14599 16661 21084
14858 16832 21086
14903 16916 21284
14964 16948 21391
1/4979 17039 21424
15052 17040 21428
15059 17127 21601
15075 17128 21645
15138 17343 21650
15196 17533 21723
15252 17639 21734
15312 17654 21735
15314 17700 21955
15315 17728 21965
15323 18068 21966
15350 18121 21976
15358 18223 22058
15359 18277 22072
15369 18496 22101
15417 18571 22176
15438 18584 22186
15462 18672 22200
15465 18785 22245
15499 18786 22246
15506 18888 22333
15576 18928
15610 19011
15655 19196
15665 19214
15670 19578
15694 19586
15699 19657
15732 19734
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